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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PATRICIA MELLOR, JAMES WHITE,
NEDRA ALLRED, THOMAS PIRTLE
and TONIA PIRTLE,
PlaintiffsRespondents,
Case No. 15,639
-vsMARK COOK, BRYANT MADSEN,
KENNETH STRATE, (and THOMAS R.:
BLONQUIST)
DefendantsAppellants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Sixth Judicial
District Court of Sanpete County, Judge Don V. Tibbs, presiding,
which held each of the defendants and their attorney, Thomas R.
Blonquist, Salt Lake City, Utah, in contempt for violation of
a certain order of the Court.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The defendants, and their attorney Thomas R. Blonquist
(hereafter collectively "defendants"), were found in contempt
for violating a Court Order dated September 22, 1977.
from that judgment that the defendants appeal.

It is

The "Sworn

Accusation" or complaint against the defendants was ultimately
dismissed and that order of dismissal is also on appeal by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services

Library Case
Services and
Technology
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
the plaintiffs as
No.
15620.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants seek a reversal of the judgment of
contempt.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 22, 1977 at the hour of 2:15 p.m., Judge
David B. Dee signed a "Order to Show Cause and Temporary Res:::
Order" in Civil No. 7556 in the Sixth Judicial District Court
Sanpete County, State of Utah.

That Order to Show Cause ordt:·

the defendants to appear in the County Courthouse in Manti, v
on Wednesday, September 28, and there show cause why a
preliminary injunction should not issue enjoining the defend'
from appointing a new superintendent of the North Sanpete
County School District and why they should not be enjoined
from "further violation of the Utah Open and Public Meetings
Act and the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act."
The Order further temporarily restrained and enjoined the
defendants from appointing a new superintendent of the North
Sanpete County School District and from violating the two
above cited Acts.
The Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order
were apparently based upon a document entitled "sworn Accusa:
which was subsequently filed with the Clerk of the Sixth
Judicial District in Sanpete County at 5 P.M. on September
22, 1977.

(R.l.)

At the time the "Sworn Accusation" was

originally filed, there was only one plaintiff, Patricia
Mellor, and the Sworn Accusation claimed that it was a
removal action to remove the defendants from their offices
on the Board of Education of the North Sanpete County schO'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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District pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 77-7-1, et.seq.
The sequence of events surrounding the obtaining of the
Temporary Restraining Order and the filing of the Sworn
Accusation are as follows:
The three defendants, Cook, Madsen and Strate had been
duly elected as members of the Board of North Sanpete County
School District and were functioning in that capacity in the
Spring of 1977.

In June and July of 1977, the Board decided

to remove Royal N. Allred as superintendent of schools in
that area and to replace him with another.

The Board solicited

applications from various individuals which resulted in the
setting of a meeting for September 22, 1977 at which time
the Board.was to consider final applicants for the superintendent
position.

A~small but vocal group of local citizens had

,,

7

opposed the actions of the school board and the consternation
of this group apparently culminated in the decision to
institute removal proceedings against the three defendants.
Patricia Mellor, an alleged taxpayer in Sanpete County, was
apparently chosen as the figurehead for the movement and to
represent this group as the plaintiff. Apparently the group
decided on September 22, 1977 that they would have to take
some action to attempt to stop the meeting scheduled for
that evening.

It appears that the attorneys for the plaintiff

called for Judge Don

v.

Tibbs in Sanpete County but discovered

that he was conducting a trial in Vernal, Utah and would be
unable to hear a motion for a Temporary Restraining Order.
(R. 37-38) .

It is assumed that attorneys for the plaintiff

were going to go to Manti, file the "Sworn Accusation"
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and then have the judge hear the motion for the Restraining
Order.

The attorneys contacted Judge Tibbs in Vernal, who

then called

the Court Administrator for the State of Utah

in Salt Lake City and asked the administrator to assign a
judge in the Third Judicial District to hear the motion for
the Temporary Restraining Order.

(R.38, 56).

The administr,

called Judge Peter Leary, presiding judge of the Third
Judicial District who suggested that Judge David Dee, assig:1c
to the Law and Motion Calendar of the Third Judicial Distric:
should be asked to hear the Motion.

Whereupon, the assistar:

court administrator, Ronald W. Goodson, assigned Judge Dee
to hear the Motion.

In a subsequent affidavit, the adminis'.:1

claimed authority pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
78-3-24 for making the assignment (R.57).
The motion of the plaintiff was heard on the afternoon
of June 22, 1977 and at 2:15 p.m., Judge Dee signed the
Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order. (R.20).
Since no pleadings had been filed in Sanpete County prior tc
the time that Judge Dee signed the Order, the attorneys for
the plaintiff, immediately after obtaining the Judge's
signature on the Order, called Mrs. Wanda Bartholomew Depur
Clerk of the Sixth Judicial District Court of Sanpete Count]
and informed her that an attorney was leaving from Salt Lai:'
City for Manti and that he would be in Manti at approximate
5:00 p.m. to file the papers.

The Attorney requested~~

Mrs. Bartholomew stay a few minutes after 5:00 p.m. in the
event that he was unable to arrive exactly at 5: 00 and Llic
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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attorney also informed her that it was important that the
papers be filed on September 22.

(R.31-32).

The attorneys

arrived at 4:58 p.m. and commenced filing the papers and
Mrs. Bartholomew stamped the Sworn Accusation as being filed
on September 22, at 5:00 P.M.

(R.l, R.31}.

The attorneys

·also had Mrs. Bartholomew issue the Temporary Restraining
Order and Order to Show Cause.
The Sworn Accusation, along with a summons and the
Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order were
then delivered to the Sheriff who served them on each of the
three defendants at approximately 6:00 p.m., as they arrived at
the scheduled meeting that evening.
In the meantime, Mr. Thomas R. Blonquist, an attorney
in Salt Lake City who had been retained by the North Sanpete
County School Board, had been contacted by Mr. Bruce J.
Nelson, attorney for.the plaintiff on the late afternoon of
September 22, 1977 and had been informed by Mr. Nelson that
the Temporary Restraining Order had been signed.

Mr. Blonquist

was on his way to the meeting in Sanpete County and arrived
in Sanpete County after the meeting had already commenced.
At the time of arrival of Mr. Blonquist, the Board was already
in a closed meeting where the Order to Show Cause and Temporary
Restraining Order were being discussed.

Mr. Blonquist at

that time advised the members of the Board that in his
opinion the Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show
Cause was improperly issued and that the Board could proceed
to hire a new superintendent on that evening.

Subsequently,

5
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the Board did in fact vote to hire a new superintendent at
the meeting of September 22, 1977.

lR. 38-39).

On September 26, 1977, the plaintiff obtained an Order
to Show Cause signed by Judge Don V. Tibbs ordering the
defendants and Thomas R. Blonquist to appear before him on
September 28, at the hour of 10: 00 a.m. and show cause why
they should not be held in contempt for disobeying the
Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause issued
on September 22 by Judge Dee.

(R. 36) .

Pursuant to request

of both counsel, the matter was continued to Friday, Septemte
30, 1977 for hearing on the contempt issue.
Both parties filed Memoranda and Affidavits in Support
of their respective positions prior to September 30, 1977,
and in addition, Mr. Blonquist (since he was also the subjec
of the Order to Show Cause), employed Robert C. Fillerup as
his counsel. The testimony at the hearing showed the follow;
1.

The Sworn Accusation was signed by the plaintiff o:

the afternoon of September 22, 1977.
2.

(R. 224).

Judge David Dee signed the Order at approximately

2:15 p.m. in Salt Lake City, Utah.
3.

At approximately 2: 30 p .m., a copy of the Restrairi;

Order along with the Sworn Accusation, Order to Show cause
and Motion for Order to Show Cause were delivered to Mr.
Blonquist at his office in Salt Lake City by Mr. Bruce
Nelson.

(R. 230-232).

4. Enroute to the regularly scheduled meeting, Mr.
Blonquist stopped and called the Clerk of Sanpete Connt)''
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approximately 4:30 p.m. and asked if the Sworn Accusation
had been filed.

He was told that the Sworn Accusation had

not been filed but that the Clerk had been requested to stay
until 5:00 p.m. so that the documents could be filed that
afternoon.

(R.232).

5. At approximately 5:00 p.m., Mr. Blonquist again
called the Clerk and was told that there were representatives
of the plaintiff there at that time filing the papers.
(R.234). Mr. Blonquist requested that the clerk note not
only the date but the time that the papers were being filed
(R.236), which notation appears on the Sworn Accusation and
the accompanying Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.
(R. l, 13).

6.

~r.

Blonquist arrived at the School Board meeting

on the evening of September 22 after the Board had entered
into "closed session".

(R.237).

At that time Mr. Blonquist

was asked concerning the Restraining Order and he advised
the Board that based upon his knowledge of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and the information that he had received
from Mrs. Bartholomew, it was his opinion that Judge Dee did
not have any jurisdiction over the matter at 2:15 p.rn. that
afternoon, that in his opinion the Court Order was void,
having been signed prior to the time that the action was
commenced.

(R.237).

He advised the Board in addition that

they could appoint a Superintendent even though the Order
had been served upon them prior to the Board Meeting.
7.

(R. 237) •

Based upon the advice of Mr. Blonquist, the Board
7
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voted in closed session 5 to 0, to hi re a new superintendent
and in open session voted 3 to 2 to hire a new superintenden:
(R. 252-2 53) .

8.

At the meeting the Board in fact hired Mr. Lloyd

Smith as the new superintendent of the School Board. (R.253).
9.

The School Board had been acting without a superint,,

from August 29, 1977 to September 22, 1977.
10.

(R.265-268).

Each of the defendants testified that they would

not have taken

the action to vote for a new superintendent

but for the advice of Mr. Blonquist.
In its Order of Contempt, the Court made the following
findings: that the Judge (Tibbsl was out of the District on
September 22, that he was notified by telephone of an inunedi;
need for a Hearing, that in conformity with the rules and
the laws, he contacted the Court Administrator's office for
the purpose of obtaining another Judge to sit in his

pla~

for the hearing of the Motion, that Judge Dee was assigned
and heard a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, which
was executed in Salt Lake City at 2:15 p.m. September 22.
The Court further found that the Sworn Accusation and other
documents were filed in the Sanpete County Clerk's office o:
September 22 at 5: 00 p .m. and that they were served upon al
three defendants personally on September 22, at 6: 00 p.m.
The Court also found that Mr. Blonquist had personal

inforrc; 1

and knowledge of the Order' at the time that he appeared at
the School Board meeting and the Court found that all the
defendants and ~r. Blonquist had knowledge of the Court
8
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order prior to the meeting of the School Board.
The Court found each of the defendants in contempt for
violating the Order on the basis that the question of the
legality of the order should have been brought before the
court upon application of counsel and that Hr. Blonquist
should not have taken upon himself to instruct anyone to
disobey the order.

The Court also found that this case had

received wide publicity to the point that the public needed
to be advised that when the Court issued an Order, it had to
be obeyed until it was set aside by further order of the
Court.

(R.293, 294).

The Court reserved the question of the amount of attorneys
fees for further hearing, which hearing was held on November
30, 1977.

(R. 173).

At that time, the Court ordered that

defendants pay to plaintiff the sum of $1,000 as attorneys
fees for obtaining a contempt citation.

The final findings,

conclusion and order were entered by the Court on December
12, 1977.

(R. 177-180).

Defendants submit that the lower Court erred in
finding contempt in the present circumstance.

9
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE DEFENDANTS
IN CONTEMPT.
The basis upon which a court can find contempt is
set forth in Utah Code Annotated, 78-32-1.

The relevant

portions of that section are as follows:
"Acts and omissions constituting contempt.
The following acts or omissions in respect
to a Court or proceedings that are in contempts of the authority of the Court:

* * *

(5) disobedience of any lawful, judgment,
order or process of the Court.
(emphasis
added) .
The judgment, order, or process of the Court must be
lawful before a defendant can be in contempt for its
violation.
The lawfulness of a contempt order is determined by
whether the issuing court had jurisdiction, Whillock v.
Whillock, 550 P. 2d 558 (Okl. 1976); and if an alleged

conte~:

can show that the act complained of as contemptuous is the
claimed violation of an order of a court which was without
jurisdiction, he may not be held in contempt, Phoenix News_M:
Inc., v. Superior Court In and for Maricopa County, 101
Arix. 257, 418 P.2d 594 (1966).

Additionally, violation of

an order patently in excess of the jurisdiction of the
issuing Court cannot produce a valid judgment of contempt,
State Ex Rel. Superior Ct. of Snohomish Co., v. Sperry, 79
Wash. 2d 69, 483 P. 2d 608

(1971).

And finally, as stated i~
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In Re Berry, .65 Cal. Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d 273 at 280;
"In this state it is clearly the law that
the violation of an order in excess of the
jurisdiction of the issuing court cannot
produce a valid judgment of contempt
(Fortenbury v. Superior Court (_1940) 16 Cal.
2d 405, 407-408, 106 P.2d 411; Brady v.
Superior Court (1962) 200 Cal. App. 2d 69,
73, 19 Cal.Rptr. 242; Grant v. Superior
Court (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 15, 19-20, 29
Cal.Rptr. 125; l Witkin, Cal. Procedure,
§ 155, pp. 421-422), and that the "jurisdiction"
in question extends beyond mere subject matter
or personal jurisdiction to that concept described by us in Abelleira v. District Court
of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, at page 291, 109
P.2d 942, at page 948, 132 A.L.R. 715:
"Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the
defined power of a court in any instance, whether
that power be defined by constitutional
provision, express statutory declaration, or
rules developed by the courts and followed
under the doctrine of stare decisis, are in
excess of jurisdiction."
These rules were acknowledged by this Court some time
ago in the case of In Re Rogers' Estate, 75 Utah 290, 284
P.992 (1930) ,wherein the Court was faced with deciding
whether the failure of an administratrix of an estate to
execute a deed in accordance with an order of a probate
court was contemptuous.

This Court found that the probate

court had exceeded its jurisdiction in quieting title in a
stranger to the probate proceedings and directing a deed to
be given to the stranger;
Under such circumstances the Probate Court
was without jurisdiction to direct Katie S.
Rogers to execute a deed to Cornelius West.
To invoke the jurisdiction of a court there
must be appropriate pleadings. Hampshire
v. Wooley (Utah) 269 P.135; Rolando v.
District Court (Utah) 271 P.225. The Order
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adjudging Katie S. Rogers guilty of contempt
is based upon the judgment directing her to
execute a deed to Cornelius West.
A failure
to comply with a void judgment is not contempt.
284 P. at 997.
(Emphasis added}.
In the present case, Judge Dee had no authority to
issue the Temporary Restraining Order for several reasons;
FIRST, the Court did not have jurisdiction as required
by Rule 3(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

That

rule states as follows:
"(c) Time of Jurisdiction.
The Court shall have
jurisdiction from the time of filing the
Complaint or the service of the surrunons."
Pursuant to the foregoing rule, a Court in this state
cannot acquire jurisdiction prior to the filing of a Compla:
or the service of a

sum.~ons.

The word "filing" as used in Rule 3 (c), relates back

t:

Rule 3 (a) which describes the manner of commencing a civil
action.

As therein defined, a civil action may be corrunencE

as follows:
"(a)
How commenced.
A civil action is
commenced (1) by filing a Complaint with
the Court, or (2) by the service of a
summons.
According to the preceding rules, a Court neither
acquires jurisdiction nor is the action commenced until
either the Complaint is filed or a summons is served.
Rule 5 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure definE
filing with the Court as follows:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"The filing of pleadings and other papers
with the Court as required by these rules
shall be made by filing them with the clerk
of the Court, except that the judge may
permit the papers to be filed with him, in
which event he shall note thereon the filing
date and forthwith transmit them to the office
of the Clerk, if any."
In the present case, the papers were clearly not filed
with Judge Dee since there is no notation upon the papers.
In addition, he did not transmit them to the office of the
Clerk.

In fact, the plaintiff must not have felt that she

had filed the papers with Judge Dee or she would not have
had her attorney call the clerk in Sanpete County and ask
her to wait while they traveled to Sanpete County to file
the papers.

Until the Complaint in the instant action had

been delivered into the hands of the Clerk of the Sanpete
County Court, there was no filing.

Since the Court can

only "have jurisdiction from the time of the filing of the
complaint," Judge Dee lacked jurisdiction at the time he
signed the Order.
SECONDLY, Judge Dee, in particular, was without authority
to hear the motion for temporary restraining order.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3-13 indicates when
judges may hold court in another county.
"Judge may hold Court in any county on request Any district judge may hold a district court
in any county at the request of the judge of
the district or of the presiding district judge,
and upon the request of the governor or the
court administrator it shall be his duty to do
so; and the judge holding the court shall have
the same powers as the judge thereof."
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Ti1is general rule allowing judges to preside anywhere
in the state is restricted, however, by the very next sectio·
Utah Code Annotated 78-3-14 which defines when judges from
another district may hear Ex parte applications.

"78-3-14. Ex parte applications from another
district A judge of the district may, in
his own district, hear any ex parte application
and make any order concerning the same, in
'
any action or proceeding pending or about to
be commenced in another judicial district, in
the following cases:
(1)
Upon the written request of the judge
of the district in which the action or proceeding
is at the time pending or is about to be commenced,
(2)
When it shall be made to appear _l:'.y
affidavit to the satisfaction of such judge
that the judge of the district court in which the
action or proceeding is at the time pending or
is about to be commenced is absent from his
district, or is incapacitated, or is disqualified
1
to act therein; such application shall be made
only to the judge of the adjoining district."
(emphasis added).
The foregoing statute makes it clear that a judge outsic
the district in which an action is pending or about to be
commenced can hear ex parte applications only under two
circumstances.

First, upon the written request of the judge

of the district in which the action is pending or, by an
affidavit showing that the judge is either out of the distrii
incapacitated, etc.

That application however, can only berna:

to the judge of an adjoining district.

The Third District c:

is clearly not adjoining to the Sixth District Court and
so subsection (2)

is inapplicable.

Since this was an ex parte proceeding, it required Jud~:
Tibbs to make a written request that a judge of the Third
District be assigned.

There was no such written

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

request~

I

the present case.
While Utah Code Annotated, §78-3-24 gives certain
powers to the administrator of the Courts, those powers
are clearly limited by Utah Code Annotated §78-3-14.
The court administrator certainly has no power to set
aside the clear requirements of that statute.
An analysis of the statutes cited oblige the conclusion

that Judge Dee was without authority to hear the motion.
F.inally, the defendants had not been served with any
process of any manner prior to the time the order was entered.
Without that service, the defendants could not be subject to
any order of the court.
The trial court's finding that any problem with the
time and manner of filing the order "was corrected upon the
moment of filing the sworn accusation which was 5:00 o'clock
in the afternoon," is clearly erroneous.

A lack of jurisdiction

over the person at the time of entry of an order or judgment
cannot be corrected by the subsequent acquisition of proper
jurisdiction.

"The general rule is that a judgment which is

void cannot be cured by subsequent proceedings."

46 Am. Jur. 2d,

349, Judgments, §50.
Since "Acquisition of Jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant generally depends on whether service of
process has been made in the manner required by law,"
20 luH. Jur. 2d, 491, courts §143, there could have been

15
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no jurisdiction of the Court over the individual defend""

at the time of the entry of the order by Judge Dee,

I'I

notwithstanding the fact that the Court subsequently acquirea\
jurisdiction.

Consequently, an order entered without such

jurisdiction is in violation of Constitutional due process
requirements and is not merely voidable but is void.

46~

Jur. 2d 330, Judgments, §25.
CONCLUSION
Defendants should not have been adjudged contemnors
for violating an Order which was void for want of
jurisdiction.

To punish defendants for the failure of

the plaintiff to properly proceed was manifestly erroneous.
The Judgment of Contempt should be reserved.
Respectfully submitted,

Y!AILED a copy of the foregoing Brief of DefendantsAppellants to:

Arthur H. Nielsen, Earl Jay Peck, and Bruce

J. Nelson of the firm of Nielsen, Henriod, Gottfredson &
Peck, Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents, 410 Newhouse
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this

-g--+f-'~"-------'

f-f/-

day of

1978.

16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

